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NOTES AND COMMENTS
for obtaining satisfactory relief are extremely limited. Several ma-
jor obstacles stand in his way. It may be noted, however, that de-
spite the barriers of available courts, available forms of relief, and
exhaustion of remedies, the seeds from which reform could grow
are in existence. On the other hand, when we reach the obstacle
created by a union-employer change or settlement of individual
rights, a more difficult problem is presented. Here a cure to the
present inequity would seem to involve a basic evaluation of the
position which the individual should have in the whole collective
bargaining structure. If the individual is to be completely sub-
ordinated, in order better to effectuate the collective system, let
this be recognized. But if he is to be given effective and enforce-
able rights, then a legislative act would seem to be required in or-
der to give some strength to these rights.
Jerome D. Adner
THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW
AN HISToRICAL ITRODUCTION
The well-known maxim, "Every man's house is his castle,"
adequately describes that right of privacy which has long been
held in the highest esteem by the citizen. It has been fashioned
as a part of our Constitutional Law by the inclusion of the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.1
This Amendment was inserted to arrest a series of abuses of
this cherished privacy by English officers acting under Parliamen-
tary authority.2 The colonists' loathing for the obnoxious writs
of assistance has been frequently assigned as one of the flames
which ignited the American Revolution. A controversy arose in
Boston in 1761 over the use of these writs by British revenue offi-
cers. The writs empowered them, in their discretion, to search
suspected places for smuggled goods. This James Otis thunder-
ingly denounced as "the worst instrument of arbitrary power,
the most destructive of English liberty and the fundamental prin-
ciples of law that was ever found in an English lawbook." "Out
of this controversy," said John Adams, "The child of independ-
ence was bornl"3
1. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or Affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized."
2. E. g., 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 11, § 5 (authorizing the issuance of writs of assistance).
3. A full account of this discussion will be found in 2 WoRxs OF JOHN ADAMS
523-525. See also vol. 10 at 183 et seq. For a history of the English use of search war-
rants, see 2 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 113-114, 149-151; 2 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE
CnowN 130, 133; 1 CHnY, CRIMINAL LAW 64 et seq. (5th ed. 1847).
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I2T THE FEDEtAL COuRTS
So bitter were our Founding Fathers' experiences with police
search for papers and articles that it was once maintained that
no search or seizure was valid.4 Although it may well have, the
Amendment does not go that far. It condemns, not all searches
and seizures, but only those such as are "unreasonable"Y
What is an unreasonable search and seizure within the inter-
dict of the Fourth Amendment has been the subject of a wealth of
Supreme Court decisions. To abstract from them a consistent doc-
trine is an impossibility. The Court has never intended to supply
a tidy formula for determining reasonableness; each determina-
tion has necessarily rested on its peculiar facts.0 Yet, the area is
susceptible of a breakdown into categories where, if it were not
for an added factor, the conduct of the law enforcement officials
would be deemed unreasonable under the Amendment.
With a warrant
The Amendment contains both a permission and a prohibition.
It condemns unreasonable searches and seizures, but continues to
recite under what circumstances a warrant may issue. Since the
permission should have the same Constitutional sanction as the
prohibition enjoys, the former restricts the scope of the latter
to the extent that a search instigated by virtue of a proper war-
rant, and confined within its bounds, can never be held unreason-
able.7
Without a warrant: an early liberal approach
The Fourth Amendment, however, has never been construed
to require that every search and seizure be affected under the au-
thority of a warrant, although it was early urged in the judicial
development of the criterion of reasonableness that the Amend-
ment be construed liberally. Boyd v. U. S.8 was the first important
expression on the law of search and seizure. The Court in the
Boyd case strained to find that a compulsory production of a
man's papers in court was a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, and that because he was thereby forced to
incriminate himself in violation of his privilege contained in the
Fifth Amendment, it was an unreasonable search under the
Fourth. There was no breaking of doors, no rummaging through
a man's effects. Mr. Justice Bradley urged a strict adherence to
4. See dissent of Frankfurter, 3., in Davis v. U. S., 328 U. S. 582, 603 (1946).
5. Carroll v. U. S., 267 U. S. 132, 147 (1925).
6. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. U. S., 282 U. S. 344, 357 (1931).
7. Gouled v. U S., 255 U. S. 298, 308 (1921).
8. 116 U. S. 616 (1886).
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the rule that Constitutional provisions for the security of persons
and property be liberally interpreted. "A close and literal con-
struction deprives them of half of their efficacy, and leads to a
gradual depreciation of the right . . . "19 Mr. Justice Bradley
continued to say that the essence of the offense is constituted by
the invasion of one's right to privacy and security, and not neces-
sarily by the entry into a man's home.
The Court often recurred to this underlying philosophy. Mr.
Justice Sutherland warned that this right, so carefully embodied
in the fundamental law, should not "be impaired by judicial sanc-
tion of equivocal methods, which, superficially, may seem to escape
the challenge of illegality, but which, in reality, strike at the sub-
stance of the Constitutional right.' 10  In Gouled v. U. S.1 the
Court pointed out that a search and seizure within the sense of the
Fourth Amendment need not involve fear or coercion. It is com-
mitted, said Mr. Justice Clarke, when a government officer, "by
stealth, through social acquaintance, or in the guise of a business
call" I 1 obtains entrance to one's home or office, and in the owner's
absence, seizes his papers without his knowledge. A search and
seizure were held bad in Taylor v. U. S.11 on the ground the agent
had abundant opportunity to obtain a search warrant and "to pro-
ceed in an orderly way."' 4 The Court has often said that searches
and seizures are to be condemned where made without a warrant,
even if the same result may have been achieved in a lawful way,'
and that a search without a warrant is inexcusable where the op-
portunity to obtain one exists. 6  Finally, no Court that looked to
the words of the Amendment, rather than at its underlying pur-
pose, would hold, as the Supreme Court did hold in Ex Parte
Jackson17, that its protection extended to letters in the mails. The
following areas, where a search and seizures are valid notwith-
standing the lack of a warrant, testify to a radical departure from
the earlier, more liberal, constructions.
Without a warrant: the search incident to a valid arrest
The right to search a person upon a lawful arrest was early
settled in our law.'8 The arresting officer may seize objects in his
9. Id. at 635.
10. Byars v. U. S., 273 U. S. 28, 33 (1927).
11. Supra note 7.
12. Id. at 305.
13. 286 U. S. 1 (1932).
14. Id. at 6.
15. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. U. S., 251 U. S. 385 (1920).
16. Carroll v. U. S., supra note 5.
17. 96 U. S. 727 (1878).
18. See 1 BisHop, NEw CR INAL PRocEDuRE 210 et seq. (4th ed. 1895).
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"possession.' 9 The purpose of the search is to discover things
connected with the crime, such as its fruits, or the means by which
it was committed, as well as that which could be used to effect an
escape from custody.20 However, authority to search the premises
upon which the arrest has been made has been conferred only in
recent years, initially to the room where the arrest was effected,
21
and, finally, to include the entire premises under the "constructive
possession" of the prisoner.2
Mr. Justice Butler, speaking for a unanimous Court in Marron
v. U. S..,23 said:
The requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the
things to be seized makes general searches under them impossible
and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing
another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discre-
tion of the officer executing the warrant.
In Harris v. U. ,5.,24 the Court sustained, by a five to four decision,
as an incident to a lawful arrest, the seizure of incriminating
papers, unrelated to the crime for which the arrest was made, and
even though the officers were unaware when the search was ini-
tiated that such property was on the premises. Thus the decision
achieves the incredible result of rendering the scope of search
without warrant broader than that of a search with a warrant.
There is a broad rule that a search, illegal in its inception,
cannot be legalized by what it brings to light. A search unlaw-
fully taken is not made valid by the discovery of evidence of
crime,25 or by a confession made by the defendant after the
search, 6 or by the arrest of the defendant after the searehY. This
would only prove that the officer guessed correctly, but the police
should not be encouraged to engage in general searches on the
chance that all will end well. Although unarticulated in the
Harris decision, there lurks the implicit suggestion that even if
the arrest were not valid (and so the search not justified when
undertaken) the objects could nevertheless have been seized be-
cause their possession was a "continuing offense" committed in
the "very presence of the officers." This implication obviously
departs from the consistent holdings to the effect that an uncon-
19. See cases cited in dissent of Frankfurter, J., in Davis v. U. S., 328 U. S. 582,
611 (1946).
20. Weeks v. U. S., 232 U. S. 383, 392 (1914).
21. Agnello v. U. S.. 269 U. S. 20 (1925).
22. Harris v. U. S., 331 U. S. 145 (1947).
23. 275 U. S. 192, 196 (1927).
24. Supra note 22.
25. Byars v. U. S., supra note 10; Johnson v. U. S., 333 U. S. 10 (1948).
26. In re Oryell, 28 F. 2d 639, 649 (W. D. N. Y. 1928) ; U. S. v. Setaro, 37 F. 2d
134, 137 (D. C. Conn. 1930) ; Nueslein v. D. C., 115 F. 2d 690, 691 (D. C. Cir. 1940).
27. Taylor v. U. S., supra note 13.
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stitutional trespass does not gain legality ab initio from a later
discovery of evidence.
The next year after the decision in the Harris case, the case of
Trupiano v. U. S.28 greatly circumscribed the practical effect of
the former holding by a ruling that, even where a valid arrest
has been made, a search without a warrant is not permissible if
the circumstances make it feasible to procure a warrant in ad-
vance. The Trupiano decision was short-lived. Two years later,
the Court in Rabinowitz v. U. S.29 sustained an hour and a half
search of an office as an incident of an arrest even though there
was ample opportunity to secure a search warrant.
Before the Harris decision, the cases had left unanswered the
question of exactly how far the right to search as an incident of
a lawful arrest extended. It extends at least to the entire prem-
ises on which the arrest is made. Might it extend further? The
notion of "constructive possession" relied upon in the Harris
case may logically be stretched to justify the search of a man's
home, no matter where he is arrested.0
Without a warrant: the search of vehicles
The Court has recognized a necessary difference between the
search of a dwelling house or a place of business and the search
of a vehicle. An emergency doctrine-the quick removal of the
vehicle out of the jurisdiction in which the warrant is sought, with
the attendant possibility of the removal of goods from that ve-
hicle-makes it impractical to secure a warrant in this area. In
U. S. v. Lee, 1 the Court applied this doctrine to a vessel seized on
the high seas. Mr. Justice Brandeis found that the seizure was
"lawful, as like a search and seizure of an automobile . . . on
land is lawful."
The right to search a vehicle and seize its contents depends
on the "probable cause" that the vehicle's contents offend against
the law.3 2 Probable cause has been defined as "facts and circum-
stances such as to warrant a man of prudence and caution in be-
28. 334 U. S. 699 (1948).
29. 339 U. S. 56 (1950).
30. Then the principles of Weeks v. U. S., supra note 20, Silverthorne Lumber Co.
v. U. S., supra note 15, and Agnello -!. U. S., supra note 21, will go by the board.
In each of these cases where defendants were arrested in one place, their homes and
offices in other places were searched contemporp.neously. It could be said with equal
logic that they were in "possession" of those other places.
31. 274 U. S. 559, 562 (1927). The Court in Lee did not clearly find a search
on the high seas. The opinion, in referring to the searchlight that had been thrown on
the vessel, stated: "[N]<. search on the high seas is shown . . . [S]uch use of a
searchlight is comparable to the use of a marine glass or a field glass" and is "not
prohibited by the Constitution". Id. at 563.
32. Carroll v. U. S., supra )wte 5; Husty v. U. S., 282 U. S. 694 (1930).
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lieving that an offense has been committed" 3 and thus it is not
necessary that the officer "should have had before him legal evi-
dence of the suspected illegal act."
34
In this area the seizing officer need not guess correctly to
have the search and seizure held reasonable. If the facts as sub-
sequently developed do not justify a judgment of condemnation
or forfeiture of the goods, the officer may escape liability by a
showing that he had probable cause for the seizure.38 The con-
trary is equally true. The officer's, guess, vindicated by the seizure
of illegally possessed goods, does not exempt him from prosecu-
tion if in fact probable cause was lacking. 8 This is, again, part
of the broader rule that a search, illegal in its inception, is not
made valid by what it brings to light..
Without a warrant: the search for public records
The scope of the interaction between the Fourth Amendment
and the Self-Incrimination Clause contained in the Fifth Amend-
ment, as early enunciated in the Boyd case, has been greatly nar-
rowed by the decision of Shapiro v. U. S.17 There, by a bare ma-
jority, the Court held that the privilege against self-incrimination
does not extend to books and records which an individual is re-
quired by law to keep to evidence his compliance with lawful regu-
lations.
The Shapiro case extends the "public records" philosophy
formulated in Davis v. U. S.18 In that case officers went to the
accused's gas station during business hours and demanded ration
coupons covering aggregate amounts of sales. The evidence was
conflicting at Davis's trial for possessing them unlawfully. The
district court found that Davis had consented to the search and
that no force or threats were used to persuade him. There was an
abundance of evidence to the contrary. The Supreme Court held
(5-3) that it could not say as a matter of law that the lower court's
finding of fact was erroneous, and it affirmed the conviction.
The case distinguished between property to which the govern-
ment is entitled to possession and property to which it is not.
The case did not go so far as to say that officers, seeking to re-
claim government property, may proceed subject to no restraints
at all, or that officers may undertake a general search of a man's
papers for the purpose of learning if he possesses such property.
33. Carroll v. U. S., supra note 5 at 149.
34. Husty v. U. S., suPra note 32 at 701.
35. Stacey v. Emery, 97 U. S. 642 (1878) ; Carroll v. U. S., supra note 5 at 155.
36. Carroll v. U. S. supra note 5 at 156
37. 335 U. S. 1 (1948).
38. 328 U. S. 582 (1946).
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The Court pointed out that the "nature" of the property indi-
cates, "that the officers did not exceed the permissible limits of
persuasion in obtaining them."' 39  The Court was not generous
enough to specify just where these "permissible limits of persua-
sion" are to be drawn, though it is clear that these limits are not
quite so narrow as where private papers are sought.
In the present era of increasing governmental regulation, the
Davis case assumes a far-reaching significance. Mr. Justice Frank-
furter points out:
If Congress, by the easy device of requiring a man to keep
the private papers that he has customarily kept, can render such
papers 'public' and non-privileged, there is little left to either
the right of privacy or the Constitutional privilege.
40
Electronic snooping: no violation of right of privacy
In this area government resourcefulness and ingenuity in ob-
taining evidence has achieved a new pinnacle. In Olmstead v. U.
S.,41 the Court held that wiretapping was not an unreasonable
search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The vehement
dissents of Mr. Justices Holmes, Brandeis, Stone and Butler have
been partially vindicated by the enactment of section 605 of the
Federal Communications Act of 1934.42 This section has been in-
terpreted as placing a ban on the use in federal courts of evidence
obtained through wiretapping,4 or procured through the use of
knowledge gained from such conversations, 4 and has been con-
strued to apply to intrastate,45 as well as interstate, messages.
Since wiretapping is not illegal Constitutionally, the legisla-
tive overruling of Olmstead has not impaired its reasoning. "The
Amendment itself clearly shows," said Mr. Chief Justice Taft,
speaking for the majority in that case, "that the search is to be
of material things-the person, his house, his papers, or his ef-
fects." Thus the line was drawn between "tangible evidence"
39. Id. at 591.
40. Dissent in Shapiro v. U. S., supra note 37 at 70.
41. 277 U. S. 438 (1928).
42. 48 STAT. 1103 (1934), 47 U. S. C. § 605 (1946).
43. Nardone v. U. S., 302 U. S. 379 (1937).
44. Nardone v. U. S., 308 U. S. 338 (1939). The second Nardone case applies the
philosophy of Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. U. S., supra note 15. to the use of evidence
obtained by wiretapping. The Court in Silverthorne stated that the "essence of a
provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely
evidence so acquired shall not be used before the court, but that it shall not be used at
all." Id. at 392.
45. Weiss v. U. S., 308 U. S. 321 (1939).
46. It was held in Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U. S. 199 (1952), that Congress did not
intend to impose a rule of evidence on the state courts; therefore § 605 does not exclude
such evidence in state court proceedings.
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and "testimony only of voluntary conversations secretly over-
heard.",
47
Following such reasoning was Goldman v. U. S., 48 which held
that the use of a detectaphone to listen to a conversation in an ad-
joining room was not within the purview of the Amendment. The
piece de resistance of government inventiveness, however, was
yet to come. It was displayed in the case of On Lee v. U. S.49
One Chin Poy, variously denominated by the government and
the defense as an "undercover agent" and "stool pigeon" for the
Narcotics Bureau, entered the accused's place of business and
engaged him in an incriminating conversation concerning On Lee's
activities in the opium market. Chin Poy was, unbeknownst to
On Lee, "wired for sound." He had a broadcasting set concealed
in his clothing which transmitted the entire conversation to an
agent stationed outside the store. This manner of obtaining evi-
dence was held to fall without the protection of the Fourth Amend-
ment.
Judge Frank raised the significant policy problem inherent in
this series of decisions in his dissent when the On Lee case was
in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals8 0 Since one cannot fore-
tell the bounds of modern scientific discovery, what will be the
effect of new detecting devices on the individual's cherished priv-
acy? It is not too far-fetched to surmise that someday a home
may be thoroughly searched without an officer setting foot on the
premises!
Admissibility of evidence: the Weeks Doctrine
The Amendment itself does not contain a method by which
the rights it secures may be enforced. The choice of a sanction to
deter violations of the right to privacy has prompted one of the
most bitter splits of opinion in the field of Constitutional Law.
The "exclusionists" have urged that meaningful freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures may be achieved only by the
exclusion of evidence secured in violation of the Amendment. The
"inclusionists," championed by Dean Wigmore 1 and Mr. Justice
Cardozo, 2 have contended with equal resolve that to exclude logi-
47. Supra note 41 at 464.
48. 316 U. S. 129 (1942).
49. 343 U. S. 747 (1952).
50. 193 F. 2d 306, 317 (2d Cir. 1951).
51. See 8 WG.moRE, EVIDENCE § 2184 (3d ed. 1940). It is interesting to note
that Wigmore evaluates the expression of Chief Justice Carroll in Youtnan v. Common
wealth, 189 Ky. 152, 224 S. W. 860 (1920), as the best that can be said for the viewpoint
of inadmissibility.
52. E. g., People v. DeFore, 242 N. Y. 13, 150 N. E. 585 (1926).
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cally relevant evidence is both unwise and ineffectual. In 1914,
with the case of Weeks v. U. S.,' the exclusionists scored a victory
in the Supreme Court.
The so-called Weeks Doctrine renders inadmissible in a fed-
eral court the fruits of the lawless search, irrespective of their
relevancy under rules of evidence. In this very case that for the
first time enunciated an exclusionary rule, the Court expressly
stated that "the Fourth Amendment is not directed to individual
misconduct of state officers. Its limitations reach the federal gov-
ernment and its agencies."154 Thus despite the Weeks Doctrine,
evidence obtained by a private person,56 or by state officers, 58 is
admissible in the federal courts, unless federal agents participated
in the improper acquisition,57 or, even having played no role, the
arrest and search were made for an offense punishable only by
Federal Law."
IN THE STATE CoURTS
Admissibility of evidence: the Wolf Doctrine
Having before only obliquely touched upon the question,50
the Supreme Court, in 1914, unequivocally declared that the
Fourth Amendment did not restrain the states.80 Thus, regardless
of the possibility that the Weeks Doctrine possessed a Constitu-
tional vitality, the states felt themselves free to reject it; most of
them have.6"
In its recent opportunity to reexamine the question whether
the right of privacy is embraced within the generic terms of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court, in
Wolf v. Cotorado,62 reversed its position of long standing and
held that it was effective against the states. Would this overturn
the many state convictions secured by the use of such unconstitu-
tional evidence? Not at all. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking
for the majority of the Court, did not regard the exclusion of evi-
53. 232 U. S. 383 (1914).
54. Id. at 398.
55. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U. S. 465 (1921).
56. Byars v. U. S., 273 U. S. 28 (1927).
57. Ibid.
58. Gambino v. U. S., 275 U. S. 310 (1927).
59. Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585 (1904); Consolidated Rendering Co. v.
Vermont, 207 U. S. 541, 552 (1908); Ha,n,,.ond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U. S.
322, 348 (1909). The Adans case has notoriously defied analysis because of its con-
fused reasoning. There seems to be an inescapable question of jurisdiction which the
Court, apparently, intentionally ignored.
60. National Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead, 232 U. S. 58 (1914).
61. For a listing, see Table I (A) in the Appendix to the opinion of Frank-
furter, J., in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 38 (1948).
62. Ibid.
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dence as vital to the right of privacy. He indicated that this right
is not without other methods of protection, and assumed the al-
ternatives to be equally effective.
6
It is a necessary prelude to explorations of the scope of the
Wolf holding to restate some trite propositions. It is well settled,
for instance, that the first eight Amendments-the Bill of Rights-
are limitations on the exercise of federal power only.0' To what
extent comparable liberties are guaranteed the person as against
state action rests upon the determination of the Supreme Court,
as these liberties are decided to fall within or without the vague
ambit of Fourteenth Amendment protection. Held to a relatively
narrow context is the scope of the Priveleges and Immunities
Clause65 and the Equal Protection Clause.6  The great flurry
of judicial activity revolves about the Due Process Clause. 7
The question of precisely what rights are to be embodied as
incidents of due process has prompted much discourse and a con-
trariety of opinion. The Court had early rejected two absolutes.
Mr. Justice Black has consistently viewed the Due Process Clause
as comprehending the first eight Amendments. 8 That notation
has been spurned time and time again."' At the other extreme,
63. Vinson, J., speaking in Nueslein v. D. C., mtpra note 26 at 695, suggests that
they are not:
If . . . admissible . . . where is the defendant's remedy for the inex-
cusable entry into his home? The causist answers-a civil action against
the officers . . . Such remedy scarcely satisfies the non-belligerent, non-legal
mind of a person whose security has already been violated and who stands
convicted. To follow that procedure means delay, expense, unwanted pub-
licity; it asks the individual to stake too much, and to take too great a chance,
in the hope of compensating the interference to his privacy.
A criminal remedy is also possible, but it is likely to be too strict or
too lax. If criminal actions are brought consistently against the enforcing
officers, before long their diligence will be enervated. If no prosescutions
are brought . . . it cannot be said that statutory criminal prosecutions afford
a deterrant to the infringement of the Fourth Amendment.
64. Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (1883) ; U. S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542
(1876) ; Feldman v. U. S., 322 U. S. 487, 490 (1944).
65. This Clause relates to the rights obviously belonging to United States citizens,
e.g., the right to pass freely from state to state, Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35 (1867) ;
to petition the government for a redress of grievances, U. S. v. Cruikshank, supra
note 64; to vote for federal officers, Ex parte Varbrough, 110 U. S. 651 (1883); to
enter the public lands, U. S. v. Waddell, 112 U. S. 76 (1884); and to inform the
federal authorities of violations of the law, In re Quarles, 158 U. S. 532 (1895). See,
also, Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 97 (1908).
66. This Clause has been largely limited to questions of discrimination on account
of race or color. E.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1880) ; Norris v.
Alabama, 294 U. S. 587 (1935) ; Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536 (1927).
67. "[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law."
68. E.g., dissent of Black, J., in Adamson v. California, 322 U. S. 46, 68 et seq.
(1947).
69. Brown v. MississiPpi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936) ; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S.
310 (1937) ; Adamson v. California, ibid.
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Mr. Justice Roberts has posed a literal argument to show that
the framers of the Bill of Rights had never intended that any
of the guarantees therein catalogued be construed a part of due
process of law.70 He assumes that the authors of the early amend-
ments did not wish to be tautological in their exposition of
enumerated rights. Therefore, to embrace within the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment any specific guarantee of the Bill
of Rights would serve to render the protection so embraced
superfluous. Since the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments are held to possess an identical pur-
view,71 the conclusion is dictated that because a guarantee is
spelled out in the Bill of Rights it cannot be implied in due pro-
cess. That this result is opposed to reason is evident. It was
rejected a half-century ago.72
In contrast with these two extremes, the present majority of
the Court has been inclined to view the nature of due process, not
as a static compendium of eternal truths, but as a living, and
growing, principle. This generative approach was first suggested
seventy-five years ago,73 and the Court has, in the main, been
faithful to maintain it. Mr. Justice Frankfurter is the most fer-
vent, and perhaps also the most prolific, exponent of the view
that the Due Process Clause renacted none of the earlier Amend-
ments: he conceives of a "gradual and empiric process of exclu-
sion and inclusion" as the proper manner to determine the scope
of the Clause.74
The Court is not unmindful of the position it occupies in a
dual form of government. As the Due Process Clause is thus
construed, it "places in the Supreme Court an enormous power
over the legislation of the states and the procedures of their courts
. . .,7 The Court has therefore felt itself constrained to include
within due process only the most basic rights. Mr. Justice
Cardozo has twice phrased for the Court the necessary criterion:
due process secures only that which is "so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people so as to be ranked as fundamental
' 7
or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.1
7 7
70. ROBERTS, THE COURT AND THE CONsTITuTIoN 65 et seq. (1951). Reviewed,
1 B~o. L. REv. 208 (1951).
71. "It ought not to require argument to reject the notion that due process of
law meant one thing in the Fifth Amendment and another in the Fourteenth." Frank-
furter, J., concurring in Adainson v. California, supra note 68 at 66.
72. Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy R. R. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 266 (1897).
73. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97 (1878).
74. Wolf v. Colorado, supra note 61 at 27.
75. RwOBERTS, op. cit. supra note 70 at 80.
76. Snsyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 105 (1934).
77. Palko v. Connecticut, suPra note 69 at 325.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Accordingly, some of the specific guarantees of the Bill of
Rights, deemed fundamental, constitute a part of due process of
law;78 other Amendments offer more than the minimal protection
contemplated and they are excluded ;7 still others may be em-
bodied only partially;80 and, finally, due process may restrain
states in a manner nowhere articulated in the first Eight Amend-
ments."'
To argue that due process requires a state to exclude from
its criminal trials evidence obtained by virtue of an unreasonable
search and seizure, one must apparently affirm, not merely that
such an exclusionary rule is the most effective way to deter viola-
tions of the right of privacy, but that it is the only effective way
to do so. If due process concerns itself with but minimal safe-
guards, questions of "better practice" are quite not in point.
The Court in Wolf was faced with a pure policy choice.
Elements of essential procedural unfairness or the hint of an
inherent unreliability in the evidence should not have been prop-
erly considered in making that choice. The Court has been solici-
tous of the basic rights of the accused and is eager that he be
secured a fair and impartial trial. There is a failure to observe
that fundamental fairness where a trial is dominated by a mob,
8 2
or where an impecunious defendant is denied right to counsel in
a serious case,83 or where his conviction results from testimony
known by the prosecution to be perjured,84 or from an involuntary
78. E.g., freedom of speech and of the press (AMEND. I), Stromberg v. Cali-
fornia, 283 U. S. 359, 368 (1931), Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1931), Grosjean
v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 234 (1936) ; freedom of religion (AMEND. I),
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940); West Virginia State Bd. of Education
v. Barnett, 319 U. S. 624 (1943) ; right of peaceable assembly (AMEND. I), Delonge
v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353 (1937) ; right of privacy (AMEND. IV), Wolf v. Colorado,
supra note 61, Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U. S. 117, 119 (1951); prohibition against
taking property without just compensation (AMEND. V), Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
R. R. v. Chicago, supra note 72.
79. E. g., Proceeding by indictment in a serious crime (AMEND. V), Hurtado v.
California, 110 U. S. 516 (1884), Gaines v. Washington, 277 U. S. 81, 86 (1928) ; privi-
lege against self-incrimination (AMEND. V), Adamson v. California, supra note 68:
double jeopardy (AMEND. V), Palko v. Connecticut, supra note 69; Confrontation of
witnesses in criminal cases (AMEND. VI), West v. Louisiana, 194 U. S. 258 (1904);
jury trial in civil cases (AMEND. VII), Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309, 341 (1915),
Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U. S. 210, 216 (1917).
80. E.g., assistance of counsel (AMEND. VI) has been deemed an element of
due process in some cases, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 .(1932), Gibbs v. Burke,
337 U. S. 773 (1949); not in others, Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455 (1942), Butc v.
Illinois, 333 U. S. 640 (1948).
81. E.g., coerced confessions, Malinski v. New York, 321 U. S. 401 (1943),
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49 (1949). Cf. Stein v. New York, 346 U. S. 156 (1953),
as noted in 3 BFIo. L. REv. 146 (1953).
82 Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86 (1923).
83. Johnson v. Zebst, 304 U. S. 458 (1938).
84. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103 (1935).
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confession induced by coercion or assault."5 However, the mere
fact that an officer engaged in an illegal search and seizure to
obtain the evidence, in no way restricts the court from rendering
a fair and impartial judgment as to the defendant's guilt or
innocence. Concededly, the reliability of the evidence so secured
is never in issue on the basis of the manner in which it is secured,
and so in this essential, the coerced confession decisions must be
distinguished away.
Thus divorced from incidental considerations, the competing
demands of two irreconcilable policies confronted the Court. On
the one hand in the interest in privacy our history shows us was
the paramount concern of the Amendment 's framers. On the other
is society's concern in bringing criminals to justice. Whether to
exclude logically relevant evidence "is an issue as to which men
with complete devotion to the protection of the right of privacy
might give different answers."""
Mr. Justice Black concurred in the result of the Wolf case
expressly on the "plain implication of the Court's opinion that
the federal exclusionary rule is not a command of the Fourth
Amendment, but is a judicially created rule of evidence which
Congress might negate."1 7 He thus equates the Weeks Doctrine
with the McNabb Rule. McNabb v. U. S.88 excludes confessions
obtained by the police where there has been a failure to take the
prisoner before a committing magistrate within a reasonable time.
The McNabb Rule, like the Weeks Doctrine, restrains the federal
government only. But the McNabb case was not decided on Con-
stitutional grounds; the result was reasoned from the supervisory
power of the Supreme Court over federal criminal justice,
9 and
intended to effectuate a legislatively expressed policy for a speedy
preliminary hearing.
From the premises upon which Mr. Justice Black has so often
insisted, it is not at all difficult to appreciate that for him the
implication is "clear". If it is true that the Bill of Rights has
been incorporated in toto within the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and that the federal exclusionary rule
has not been so incorporated, the latter must necessarily persist
in the federal courts subject always to the possibility of a Con-
85. Brown v. Mississippi, supra note 69.
86. Wolf v. Colorado, supra note 61 at 28.
87. Id. at 39-40.
88. 318 U. S. 332 (1943).
89. The Court has early and often recognized its authority to formulate rules
of evidence to be applied in federal criminal prosecutions. See U. S. v. Palmer, 3
Wheat. 610, 643-644 (1819) ; Wolfe v. U. S., 291 U. S. 7 (1934). See, also, 1 WIGMORE,
EvDmNcE 6 (3d ed. 1940).
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gressional overriding. Nevertheless, if the Court wished to so
find, there is the technical possibility that the Weeks Doctrine
possesses a Constitutional significance. Mr. Justice Frankfurter
should certainly not be held to have maintained in Wolf that the
Fourth Amendment restrains the states. It was the essence of
that Amendment-the right to privacy-that was deemed basic
to a free society. The Weeks Doctrine could well be the aura of
that essence, a residue representing the best sanction of the Fourth
Amendment. Thus viewed, Congress could no more legislate it
away, as it could the privilege against self-incrimination, o0 which,
too, exists only to restrain the federal government.
Rochin and Irvine compared
When a state prosecution is predicated on the Wolf Doctrine,
the case obviously presents no federal question as to the propriety
of the admittance of illegally seized evidence, unless the behavior
of the police may be characterized as constituting something more
than a mere search and seizure. In Rochin v. California,0 ' the
Supreme Court reversed a conviction for the illegal possession
of narcotics, holding that the forcible extraction of morphine
capsules from the accused's stomach by means of a stomach pump
and emetics violated due process. The Court described the
stomach pumping as "conduct that shocks the conscience," as a
procedure "bound to offend even hardened sensibilities," as
"methods too close to the rack and the screw," as acts which
"offend the community's sense of fair play," and as "brutal
conduct." 92  The practical distinction between the Wolf and the
Rochin cases is that the evidence was admissible, and the convic-
tion affirmed in the former, and that the evidence was held inad-
missible, and the conviction reversed in the latter. Since the
right of privacy is an incident of due process, the conduct of the
police in the Wolf case was as much violative of due process as
the stomach pumping in the Rocehin case. The real clue to the
distinction lies in the difference in the degree of the conduct, and
not in a difference in kind. If police conduct may be envisaged
as plotted on a continuum of reprehensibility-every whit of it,
from the most subtle to the most screaming, a violation of due
process- it is not until five justices are sufficiently shocked that
a conviction will be overturned. Confessedly, the area on that
continuum in which the line of demarcation is to be redrawn in
each case is hopelessly vague.
90. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547 (1892). Congress must provide an
immunity coextensive with the privilege.
91. 342 U. S. 165 (1952) ; noted, 1 BFLO. L. REv. 318 (1952).
92. Id. at 172-173.
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In Irvine v. California,91 a majority of the Court expressed
its disdain for the approach it so approbiously termed ad hoc.
Where officers listened in relays to everything that was said in
the defendant's house for a period of a month via a secret micro-
phone installed in his bedroom, gaining surreptitious entry into
the home with a key a locksmith had fashioned at their behest,
to install and twice to relocate the microphone, Justice Jackson
was indeed shocked. He stated the conduct "would be almost
incredible if it were not admitted.'"'" However, these facts were
held inadequate to bring the case within the sway of the Rochin
case. The distinction was made on the basis of the interest to be
protected. "However obnoxious are the facts in the case before
us, they do not involve coercion, violence or brutality to the per-
son, but rather a trespass to property, plus eavesdropping."
95
Thus the facts differ in kind and not merely in degree.
The Irvine case, under this suggested analysis, sets up a new
absolute, namely, that even "incredible" behavior of the police
will never vitiate a conviction where only the property, and not
the person of the accused, has been invaded. The Justice denies
that this result, intended to inject more certainty into the law in
this amorphous area, will encourage a greater lawlessness on the
part of the police. The policy arguments of Wolf to the contrary
are resurrected and extended to embrace the length of the
continuum.
The very heart of due process was the rejection of absolutes-
the "antithesis of Procrustean rule." By the Irvine decision the
Court has made a serious inroad into the essential concept of
due process.
Conclusion,
In a very practical sense, the area of search and seizure may
be summarized in terms of admissibility of evidence. The federal
courts exclude illegally seized evidence; the state courts may elect
to receive it. Where the conduct of the police becomes so aggra-
vated as to be "brutal" or "shocking" every court must exclude
evidence, the result of that conduct; however it is suggested that
the state courts need not do so where the conduct was not directed
to the person of the defendant, but merely to his property.
Paul Gonson
93. 74 Sup. Ct 381 (1954).
94. Id. at 383.
95. Id. at 383.
